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Abstract
This study introduces a cooperative game theory approach aimed at addressing the problem of 
allocating pollution responsibility across partners collaborating in supply networks. The 
proposed framework includes three different allocation rules through which companies can share 
pollution responsibility across complex supply networks. A case study in the context of a supply 
network for the manufacturing of construction materials is illustrated for demonstrating the real-
world applicability of the approach.
Keywords: Supply Networks, Multi-Tier, Pollution Responsibility Allocation, Game Theory, 
Shapley Value
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Pollution responsibility allocation in supply networks: 
A game-theoretic approach and a case study
Abstract
This study introduces a cooperative game theory approach aimed at addressing the problem 
of allocating pollution responsibility across partners collaborating in supply networks. The 
proposed framework includes three different allocation rules through which companies can 
share pollution responsibility across complex supply networks. A case study in the context of 
a supply network for the manufacturing of construction materials is illustrated for 
demonstrating the real-world applicability of the approach.
Keywords: Supply Networks, Multi-Tier, Pollution Responsibility Allocation, Cooperative 
Game Theory, Shapley Value
1. Introduction
Environmental consciousness plays a pivotal role in contemporary global supply networks 
(Allaoui et al., 2018). Newly introduced regulations, especially in the European Union (EU), 
require robust sustainability certifications for companies participating in public procurement 
exercises (UN Global, 2011). Also, in the private sector, large multi-national enterprises are 
adopting tighter requirements for their suppliers, which also involve small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) (UN Global, 2011). 
Such stringent environmental performance standards also encourage the implementation of 
benchmarking approaches; for instance, Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) methods allow 
estimating environmental impacts of supply networks against a wide set of indicators. 
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While LCA methods are gaining popularity, they should be enhanced by considering the 
concept of pollution responsibility. Allocating environmental impacts (including carbon 
emissions, land use, waste generation) to actors in the supply network is a fundamental issue 
if proper mitigation, abatement and remedial actions need to be implemented. This debate is 
very relevant to policy-making; for instance, currently, the European Union and national 
governments are promoting directives and legal requirements for maximising the proportion 
of marketed products which are recovered and recycled (European Commission, 2014). Such 
directives extend the producer responsibility, forcing them to have adequate plans (and 
adequate financial commitments) for managing the materials in their products at the end of 
their life. Policies can also involve incentives for producers to design their products taking 
into account environmental considerations (European Commission, 2014; Gui et al., 
2018). Similar obligations currently cover producers of packaging, batteries, vehicles, tyres 
and electrical goods, with calls for these obligations to be extended to other consumer 
goods, with the objective of achieving a reduction in the environmental impact of products, 
throughout their lifespan, from production through end-of-life.
Scientific interest in the pollution responsibility issue started with the aim of suggesting 
pollution burden sharing mechanisms across countries (see, for instance: Leontief and Ford, 
1970; Wyckoff and Roop, 1994; Bastianoni et al., 2004; Lenzen and Murray, 2010). While an 
abundant stream of literature has been developed in order to tackle allocation problems 
within different contexts, the vast majority of the current methods analyze these problems at 
a macro-level (Zhou and Wang, 2016). The application of pollution responsibilities 
approaches to contemporary multi-tier and multi-stakeholders supply networks is often 
overlooked. 
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In order to bridge this literature gap, this study provides a normative framework (based on 
cooperative game theory) for pollution responsibility allocation across multi-tier supply 
networks. After the formal identification of literature gaps through an appropriate review 
(Section 2), the paper presents the mentioned framework from a general point of view 
(Section 3). In Section 4, such framework is adapted to a generic supply network, by 
developing appropriate pollution responsibility allocation rules. Section 5 develops a 
practical application of the introduced cost allocation rules, with the reference to a case study 
from the construction materials supply network; results, along with some managerial 
implications are also discussed. Conclusions and avenues for future research are then drawn.
 
2. Environmental Pollution Responsibility: a Literature Review 
Based on the review by Zhou and Wang (2016), pollution responsibility allocation methods 
can be classified into several categories, which are discussed in details in the following of this 
section. 
2 1 Indicator-based approaches
One of the most popular methods for determining environmental pollution targets or 
permits is the one based on the development of specific indicators (Zhou and Wang, 2016). 
Methods based on single-indicator approaches employ an individual indicator for allocating 
emission permits or reduction targets among a set of actors (Rose and Stevens, 1993). Single 
indicators that have been used for this purpose include Population, GDP, Emissions and 
Energy Usage, Emission Intensity. Also, composite indicator approaches have been 
developed in order to develop multi-criteria tools incorporating multiple perspectives for 
conducting the allocation exercise (Ringius et al., 1998; Vaillancourt and Waaub, 2004). 
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Notably, the work of Gallego and Manfred (2005) and Lenzen et al. (2007) illustrated 
approaches for pollution responsibility allocation based on an Input-Output (I/O) analysis 
framework. Through a Multi-Regional I/O framework, Zhang et al. (2015) proposed 
mechanisms (based on both production and consumption perspectives) for allocating carbon 
emissions at a provincial level in China. Llop and Ponce-Alifonso (2015) proposed a 
structural path method for allocating responsibilities related to water ecosystems 
degradation. 
2 Optimization approaches
Optimization approaches (based on mathematical programming framework) can successfully 
be employed for dealing with pollution allocation problems. Efficiency perspectives (i.e., 
minimizing the cost of pollution abatement measures) mainly characterize these studies. 
According to Zhou and Wang (2016), Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a very popular 
approach for solving this sort of problems. Färe et al. (2012) proposed a DEA model for 
evaluating pollution abatement strategies in different countries over a multi-year time 
horizon. Several authors have proposed DEA for examining emissions allocation across 
Chinese provinces (e.g. Wei et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2013; Zhou et al., 2014). Lozano et al. 
(2009) and Sun et al. (2014) provide applications to the micro-level (i.e., single firm).
2.3 Game Theoretic approaches 
Pollution allocation mechanisms often include negotiation and bargaining processes among 
multiple actors. As such, Game Theory might model these situations in a very effective way, 
with allocation results which could be seen as equilibrium solutions to games. 
Chander and Tulkens (1995) and  Filar and Gaertner (1997) provided seminal contributions 
employing Game Theory for studying the allocation emission reduction quotas among 
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countries; classical cooperative game theory concepts (including the Shapley value method) 
have been utilized for this purpose, with the aim of achieving fair and equitable distributions 
(Rose, 1990). 
Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003) developed a similar approach to the problem, while Germain 
and Steenberghe (2003) adopted a dynamic game framework. In order to solve a similar 
allocation problem, Viguier et al. (2006) deployed a two-level game. At a regional level, Shi et 
al. (2017) test multiple game-theoretic approaches (i.e., the nucleolus, Nash-Harsanyi 
allocation solution, Shapley value and Separable Cost Remaining Benefit principle) for 
evaluating collaborative and cost-effective SO2 reduction strategies in three cities of Hunan 
province in China. Similarly, Huang et al. (2018) developed a game-theoretic model based on 
the formation of fuzzy coalitions in order to deal with pollution discharge rights.
At a company unit of analysis, MacKenzie et al. (2008) utilized rank-order contests for 
allocating pollution perits; MacKenzie et al. (2009) developed a further application to the 
same problem by employing incomplete information games. Chung et al. (2013) deployed 
dynamic games to evaluate companies responses to environmental pollution taxes in a 
spatially distributed supply chain. Liao et al. (2015) applied a Shapley value framework for 
working out a fair allocation of emission allowances across energy producers in Shanghai. A 
Stackelberg game is constructed by Ren et al. (2015) for studying CO2 reduction targets in a 
buyer-supplier interaction. Compared to the other methods, the game theoretic approach 
might seem less straigthforward. However, such methods have the advantage of inherently 
incorporating the implicit negotiations between different stakeholders about environmental 
pollution responsibility allocation. The use of these approaches, however, is underexploited, 
especially when dealing with complex and multi-tier supply networks which can represent 
real-world production systems. 
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4 Hybrid Approaches
Hybrid approaches combine multiple methods from the above-mentioned categories. For 
example, Ridgley (1996) integrated composite indicators with an optimization method for 
producing suitable pollution responsibility allocations at a country level. Gomes and Lins 
(2008) combined Data Envelopment Analysis and Game Theory for solving the problem at 
the same level; Sun et al. (2017) employed a similar combination in order to deal with 
emission permits allocation across competing companies. Similar frameworks have also been 
employed by Pang et al. (2015) for permit allocation across countries.  Yu et al. (2014) 
addressed the problem from a regional perspective in China by combining a particle swarm 
optimization algorithm, fuzzy c-means clustering algorithm, and game-theory approaches 
based on Shapley decomposition. 
Hybrid approaches have generally a higher level of complexity; therefore, allocation results 
might lack transparency. Nevertheless, the combination of multiple methods can allow the 
simultaneous consideration of different fairness and efficiency criteria.
2.5 Research Gaps and Contribution of the Paper
The proposed overview of the literature, coherently with findings from the extensive review 
from Zhou and Wang (2016), allows the identification of the following gaps: 
- Most of the literature is concerned with pollution responsibility at a macro-level, 
dealing with allocation problems from a national or regional perspective. 
- Despite the existence of firm-level approaches, the supply chain perspective has 
been, so far, largely overlooked. Also, the few approaches which are available in this 
domain are characterized by very simple buyer-supplier dyadic relationships. 
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- Multi-tier perspectives and multi-stakeholder views, which are intrinsic to 
contemporary supply networks, involving multiple companies at each tier, are rarely 
incorporated.
In order to bridge these gaps, the main contribution of this paper focuses on the 
development of a pollution responsibility allocation framework for a generic multi-tier and 
multi-stakeholder supply network (characterized by the presence of multiple companies at 
each tier). A game theoretic approach, based on the recent work from Ciardiello et al. (2018), 
will be developed, given the suitability of such methods for dealing with these problems 
(Zhou and Wang, 2016; Ciardiello et al., 2018). 
3. A general game theoretic responsibility framework for supply networks
We recall the game theoretic responsibility framework, which has been introduced in 
Ciardiello et al. (2018). A supply network consists of companies ( ). A generic  = 
process represents the production of goods by company  to be supplied to company . 	
  
A set of processes  (with ) is associated with each company. For a generic  |  
representation of such supply network, see Figure 1. The set  is equal to .   = 
Furthermore, each process is characterized by an environmental cost (indicated as , with 
the generic  belonging to a generic set ). 
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Figure 1  Generic supply network representation
A generic mathematical framework can be constructed as follows:
A  responsibility matrix  can be  (

)                                           (1)  ×    = (
)
introduced, where the row index  represents companies and the column index  represents  
processes;  if company  is responsible for process ,  otherwise. Let  be  = 1    = 0 
the set of the processes for which company  is environmentally responsible, that is   =
 It is remarkable to outline that  may be equal to 1 even if process {   = 1}. 
does not involve company .  Therefore, the framework (1) can be rewritten as ,  (


)
where  is the responsibility matrix. A coalition responsibility set can be defined as   =
; then, the social cost function for each coalition of companies  can be       
defined as follows:
() =     !                                                             (2)
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The last quantity is the environmental cost of all the processes for which at least one 
company, which belongs to the coalition S, is responsible. Moreover, each cost is 
enumerated only once even if more than one company may be responsible for the same 
process.
Being  a finite set,  is a function which associates a real value with each subset of  #$ 2%&
. Following a classical definition,  represents a cooperative game with a characteristic  	
#)
function. In addition, the elements in  are called players;  represents the characteristic  #
function of the game. By construction, the characteristic function  is defined through   

and , therefore leading to the following primitive model:' = (



)                                (3)
Such cooperative games are defined in terms of a characteristic function, which specifies the 
utility that each coalition can achieve. By assuming the formation of a grand coalition, the main 
aim of such games is the definition of a solution concept, which allocates utility (or, 
alternatively, costs) among each player in .  In a supply network context, it can be assumed 
that companies form binding agreements for coordinating production activities. Cooperative 
game theory can provide solutions by allowing transferable payments among companies. 
Therefore, the cost allocation becomes a vector taking into account ) = ())  &||+   
transferable payments. Such redistribution is efficient in our settings. To be more precise, an 
allocation is efficient if the sum of all cost-allocations, that is , is equal to the sum of  |N|i = 1)
all costs, i.e. .  = 1  = 1
Among efficient allocations, the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) represents an allocation rule, 
which has gained a relevant normative reputation because of its distributive justice. 
Following this fair approach to cost allocations, we claim that allocations satisfy the 
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following property: if  is empty implies that is null. Throughout the current, paper we  ) 
will always refer to allocations satisfying the responsibility-compatibility principle. 
4. Responsibility rules for Supply Networks
The set of processes  can be seen as a mathematical relation defined on the set of 
companies   We define as the section of the relation   P(): = {  .(
)  }    × 
for the element  . The subset  can be interpreted as the set of companies,    P()  
which are supplied by company  Similarly we define the inverse relation of  that is .  
  / 1
We say that  if and only if , namely if the company  supplies the (
)   / 1 (
)   
company . It follows that  means that the company  is supplied by the  (
)   / 1 
company  Similarly we define the section of  for  in the following way:   / 1   / 1() =
. {  . / 1 () = }
We also define the transitive closure of the relation , and we denote it by . By definition, P
 
 if and only if there exists a chain of firms  such that  with (i
)   0! =  	0!,0! + 1)  P !
 where  and   Similarly, we define the transitive closure of the = 1m 0
1
=  02 + 1 = 
relation , denoted by . Therefore, we have that  if and only if there exists  / 1  / 1    / 1()
a chain of firms  such that  and  with .  0! 0! + 1   / 1(!) 0! =  ! = 12
We define the following set of firms on the supply network structure: 
- . Such a subset contains all the firms, which are located 3() = {}   / 1()
downstream with respect to ; for each  in  there exists a path composed of  ! 3()
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processes which start form the product supplied by the company  and, at the end, 
becomes a product which is supplied to the company . !
- . Similarly, this represents the set of firms located upstream in the 4() = {}  ()
supply network with respect to . 
In this section, we assume that each company can act as a supplier for a single company 
within the supply network of a given product. By assuming this, the supply network assumes 
a tree-structure (see Figure 2). As such, since  is a singleton, there is one and only one P()
process starting from ; the cost attached to this process can be identified as  i .
Let us call . In this context, we can assume that existence of a final company|| =  + 1
; such a company is characterized by the following assumption:  We  + 1  + 1 = 5
further assume that the final company has no environmental responsibility, which is 
characterized by the assumption  If straightforwardly follows that the  + 1 = 5
responsibility matrix is a  matrix, where  the number of firms and 	 + 1) ×   	 + ! 
is the number of processes. From the company , a single process starts, and it supplies the 
final company . Because we focus on responsible-compatible allocation, we can say  + 1
that . Therefore, we disregard the final company because of its always null ) + 1 = 0  + 1  
cost allocation. Therefore the number of significant firms becomes equal to the number of 
processes . 
 
$&&(37('0$186&5,37
12
Figure 2  Tree-type supply network representation
The responsibility matrix  can be defined according to three different responsibility 
 
allocation principles, introduced as follows: 
- A Local Responsibility principle (LR), according to which each company  is strictly 
responsible for the pollution costs, related to the production activities strictly 
happening at its premises. Then we may formalize  where  is the only  = (
) 
company supplied by firm  
- An Upstream Responsibility principle (UR), stating that upstream suppliers (dealing 
with raw material extraction, sub-component manufacturing and other energy 
intensive activities) are responsible not only for pollution happening at their 
premises, but can also influence the environmental performance of downstream 
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partners. This can be formalized, for a generic company i, as:  =
{	0
6  0   3(), k   }.  
- A Downstream Responsibility principle (DR), stating that downstream partners in 
the supply network are responsible of the polluting activities happening at upstream 
suppliers premises. This can be formalized, for a generic company i, as:  =
 {	0
6  0   4(), k   }.
In the previous Section 3, we introduced the model  where the ' = (



)
responsibility matrix was generic. Here we adopt the three above responsibility matrices and, 
then, we obtain three different cooperative models. We say that  becomes:'
- A stand-alone game if the LR principle is adopted.
- An upstream-oriented game if UR principle is adopted. 
- A downstream-oriented game if DR principle is adopted. 
It can be noted that the mathematical formulation of our model in (3), when LR or UR or 
DR responsibility principles are adopted, becomes equivalent to the river network problem 
introduced by Dong et al. (2012). In this problem, a river network is polluted by agents 
agents (e.g., firms, villages, municipalities, or countries) which are located upstream and 
downstream. Agents must deal with pollution by implementing some mitigation actions, 
whose costs must be distributed among the agents themselves. Dong et al. (2012) model 
this problem as a cost sharing problem on a tree network. Interestingly, (Dong et al., 2012) 
find a solution to the river network problem by using LR, UR and DR principles. They 
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allocate cleaning costs to the different municipalities and the government by using the 
Shapley value allocation method (which provides a responsible-compatible cost allocation)1.
.Given the fact that the mathematical formulation of the model presented in (3) is equivalent 
to the one from Dong et al. (2012), it can be deduced that Shapley value allocations for such 
a model are equivalent to the ones provided by Dong et al. (2012) for the river network 
problem (by taking into account that the company  has always a null cost allocation). 	 + 1)
As such, the following allocation rules from Dong et al. (2012) can be adapted to our case 
(refer to the original paper for the proof of the related theorems).
Allocation Rule 1 - LRS 
Local Responsibility Sharing cost allocation rules can be defined as:
(4) )LRS = ci
Furthermore, as shown by Dong et al. (2012), is the Shapley value of the stand-alone )LRS  
game (



).
Allocation Rule 2 - DES
The Downstream Equal Sharing cost allocation rule can be defined as:
(5))DES =  j  4(i) cj|?(j)|
1 The compatible-responsible nature of the Shapley value allocation can be shown with the 
following simple proof. Let us assume that a firm  is endowed with an empty subset .  B
i
Given the coalition responsibility set and the mathematical formulation of (2), it is 
straightforward to see that firm  does not increase pollution costs of any group of 
companies. The latter means that company , according to a classical property of the Shapley 
value, can be regarded as a dummy player; as such, the Shapley value of firm  is null.  
Therefore, the Shapley value is a responsible-compatible cost allocation.
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Furthermore, as shown by Dong et al. (2012),    is the Shapley value of the upstream x
DES
i
oriented game (



).
Allocation Rule 3 - UES
The Upstream Equal Sharing cost allocation rule can be defined as: 
(6))UES
i
=  j  ?	, cj|4(j)|     
Furthermore, as shown by Dong et al. (2012), is the Shapley value of the downstream )UES
i
 
oriented game .(



)
5. A Case Study
The developed approach has been tested on a real-world case study related to the supply 
network for the manufacturing of thermal and insulation materials. Insulation materials (for 
thermal and acoustic purposes) represent one of the crucial components in the construction 
of new buildings and in renovation projects. In the United Kingdom (UK), insulation 
products contribute largely to construction materials markets. Also, with the growing 
emphasis placed on the energy performance of buildings, such materials play a pivotal role in 
improving environmental credential of construction projects, through prevention of heat 
loss in buildings.
Stone wool (a furnace product of molten rock) represents one of the main insulation 
materials based in the construction industry (Väntsi and Kärki, 2013). 
This case study focuses on the supply network associated with the production of stone wool. 
Primary data from one of the leading producer for this material (which is here anonymised 
for confidentiality purposes), along with Ecoinvent (2018) database were utilized to extract 
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data related to the cradle-to-grave part of the supply network of the product. This includes 
raw material inputs, energy inputs (assuming medium voltage electricity for industrial use in 
the UK), production process, distribution processes up to the retail store; emissions 
associated with the installation of product, its usage and disposal are not included. 
In a typical supply network, carbon equivalent emissions (expressed in Kg CO2-eq per Kg) 
can be utilized as a proxy indicator for a wide range of environmental impacts (Genovese et 
al., 2017). Based on multiple sources (Nasir et al., 2017; Ecoinvent et al., 2018), CO2-eq 
emissions (per kilogram of product) happening at each stage of the supply network can be 
reported as shown in Figure 3. Pollution abatement costs can be assumed proportional to 
such environmental impacts.
The results of the three allocation principles shown in Section 4 (LRS, UES, DES) to the 
considered supply network are shown in the following Figures 4, 5 and 6; calculations were 
performed in the Mathematica 10 computing environment through the code provided in the 
Appendix. 
As expected, the three proposed allocation principles provide very different results, 
allocating different shares of the total environmental impacts to different supply network 
partners. By employing the LRS rule, the highest proportion of environmental impacts (and, 
therefore, of associated mitigation costs) is assigned to the actual stone wool producer, 
respecting a simple proportionality mechanism. UES and DES rules produce more complex 
allocations. Interestingly, the DES rule strongly penalizes the Retailer (who is seen as 
responsible for demanding the activation of the whole supply network for the manufacturing 
of the products that are going to be sold at its premises), while the UES one penalizes the 
raw material suppliers (which are seen as responsible for extracting and employing virgin 
$&&(37('0$186&5,37
17
resources). It must be highlighted that such rules reproduce respectively the concepts of 
consumer and producer responsibility (as defined by Rodrigues and Domingos, 2008). 
The three allocation rules must not be seen as mutually exclusive; indeed, convex 
combinations of these rules might be developed. Table 1, as an example, illustrates the 
results deriving from a combination of the LRS and DES rules. This could be done for 
introducing, within a prevailing LRS framework, elements of downstream responsibility. 
Figure 3  Environmental Impacts (in Kg CO2-eq/Kg
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Figure 4  Local Responsibility Sharing Allocation Results
Figure 5  Downstream Equal Sharing allocation results
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Figure 6  Upstream Equal Sharing allocation results
# Supply Network Stage Emissions Share
LRS + DES 
(50-50)
LRS + DES 
(80-20)
1 Potato Starch 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2 Biocides 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
3 Paper 0.08% 0.05% 0.07%
4 Binder 17.07% 10.67% 14.51%
5 Bauxite Mining 0.07% 0.05% 0.06%
6 Basalt, Limestone and Dolomite Mining 1.33% 0.83% 1.13%
7 Chemical Supplies 29.63% 18.52% 25.19%
8 Pallet 0.67% 0.45% 0.58%
9 Board 0.00% 0.01% 0.00%
10 Acrylic Paint 1.10% 0.74% 0.95%
11 Rockwool Production 47.29% 37.54% 43.39%
12 Packaging Film Production 1.55% 1.04% 1.34%
13 Packed Rockwool 1.21% 15.37% 6.87%
14 Rockwool at Retailer 0.00% 14.76% 5.90%
Table 1 - Hybrid Allocation Rules
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6.1 Implications and Remarks
The illustrated model, together with the described allocation rules, could be utilized by 
governmental and environmental agencies in order to allocate pollution responsibilities (and 
associated costs), especially in centrally planned economic systems. 
In free-market scenarios, focal firms still need to co-operate with partners from their supply 
networks in order to measure and manage environmental impacts, according to self-
regulatory mechanisms (Sundarakani et al., 2010). Within these contexts, the mentioned 
responsibility rules could be seen as representative of different supply chain leadership styles 
(Gosling et al., 2016) adopted by the focal firm. In particular, the Local Responsibility 
principle (stating that each company is just responsible for activities strictly happening at its 
premises) can be related to a lasseiz-faire leadership style. According to this style, the focal 
company of the supply chain is not taking much action in terms of mitigation of 
environmental impacts, letting individual companies dealing with the problem.
The Downstream Responsibility principle (stating that downstream actors in the supply 
chain  such as retailers- will take the burden of some of the pollution costs incurred by 
upstream suppliers) can be seen as related to a transformational leadership style, in which the 
focal firm takes responsibility for enhancing the performance of the whole supply chain; 
indeed, downstream actors (that, in many cases, constitute the most powerful entities of the 
supply chain) have all the interest to improve the environmental performance of their 
suppliers, as this will result in lower environmental impacts (and related costs) being 
allocated to themselves as well. 
The Upstream Responsibility principle, stating that upstream suppliers (typically involved in 
energy intensive activities, such as raw material extraction) are responsible not only for 
pollution happening at their premises, but will be also allocated shares of the environmental 
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performance of downstream partners (who will be purchasing and utilizing these goods) can 
be seen as related to a transactional leadership style, in which the focal firm (usually involved 
in the final stages of the supply chain) will have a great amount of power towards upstream 
suppliers. 
6. Conclusions 
This study has provided a normative framework based on a cooperative game theory 
responsibility model for pollution allocation; the paper has detailed the generic model in the 
case of a complex real-world supply network, by selecting three different responsibility 
principles (namely: Upstream, Downstream and Local Responsibility) and developing some 
associated pollution responsibility allocation rules; results, along with some managerial 
implications have been discussed. 
The presented work could be extended in future researches, in order to address some of the 
limitations that characterize the current approaches. First of all, different supply network 
structures, including, for instance, reverse and circular elements could be studied (see, for 
instance: Choudhary et al., 2015; Battini et al., 2017). Also, different pollution responsibility 
schemes might incorporated in the model (similarly to the work proposed by Jacobs and 
Subramanian, 2012). Furthermore, a new set of normative properties could be defined, 
aimed at specifically addressing the stability of transnational supply networks operating 
across different environments characterized by different environmental legislations. Finally, 
further industrial case studies could be developed, in order to investigate the suitability of 
game-theoretic approaches to real-world pollution responsibility allocation problems.
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Appendix
The aim of this section is to provide a heuristic algorithm to compute allocations for a 
generic supply network. In the following, the algorithm and its implementation (by utilising 
the syntax provided by the modelling environment Wolfram Mathematica 10) will be shown. 
Input data
A graph g=(N,P) can be built for describing the supply network by employing the dedicated 
Mathematica 10 function. The attribute EdgeWeight defines the costs associated with each c
j
 
edge. 
Basic functions
The two following fundamental functions can be defined for the development of the 
algorithm. 
We consider the list of companies, which are part of at least one directed path starting from 
company x_, including company x_. The previous list is composed by the companies which 
are downstream to company ,  i.e.   The function f[x_], defined as follows,  finds the  3(C_).
length of such a list. 
                           f[x_] := Length[Sort[VertexOutComponent[g, {x}]]]
Similarly, we consider the list of companies, which are part of at least one directed path 
ending at company x_, including company x_. The previous list is composed by the 
companies which are upstream to company , i.e.   The function t[x_], defined as  4(C_).
follows, finds the length of such a list of companies. 
t[x_] := Length[Sort[VertexInComponent[g, {x}]]]
In general these two lists are different because g is a directed graph.
Allocation Rule 2  DES
We compute the DES allocation for a generic company  (with  ranging between 1 and  2 2 
-1).  The list of costs related to companies which are upstream to company m including , 2
i.e. companies in , can be defined through the following code:4 (2)
Total [PropertyValue 
[{g,#},EdgeWeight]&/@Sort[EdgeList[g,DirectedEdge[Alternatives@@VertexInC
omponent[g,{m}],_]      
The selection VertexInComponent[g,{m}] selects the list of companies which are 
upstream to company  including . For each of these companies, lets say  we compute 2 2 s,
the length of the list of companies which are downstream to each company . In doing this s
we utilize the function f[x_].  The length of the previous list is:
Map[f,Sort[VertexInComponent[g,{m}]]]]] 
The two above-mentioned lists (which have the same dimension) can be employed to 
compute the ratios contained in the allocation formula (5). All these contributions are 
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summed up (as per Equation (4)) thanks to the function Total. Similarly, company  has the 
following allocation:
Total[Append[PropertyValue[{g,#},EdgeWeight]&/@Sort[EdgeList[g,DirectedEdg
e[Alternatives@@VertexInComponent[g,{VertexCount[g]}],_]]],0]/  
Map[f,Sort[VertexInComponent[g,{VertexCount[g]}]]]]
Allocation Rule 3 UES
For UES allocations, the nature of the algorithm is the same with some modifications. The 
role of VertexInComponent[g,{m}] is replaced by VertexOutComponent[g, {m}]. The 
role of function f[x_] is replaced by the function t[x_]. VertexOutComponent[g, {m}] 
finds the list of companies, which belong to any path starting from the node , i.e. the 2
companies which belong to .  The UES allocation formula (6) can be computed as:3(2)
Do[  
Print[
Total[    
Append[PropertyValue[{g, #}, EdgeWeight] & /@        
Sort[EdgeList[g,          
DirectedEdge[Alternatives @@ VertexOutComponent[g, {m}], _]]],       0]
/
Map[t, Sort[VertexOutComponent[g, {m}]]]]], 
{m, 1,    VertexCount[g]}]
